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Abstract
An investor with constant relative risk aversion and an infinite planning horizon trades a
risky and a safe asset with constant investment opportunities, in the presence of small transac-
tion costs and a binding exogenous portfolio constraint. We explicitly derive the optimal trading
policy, its welfare, and implied trading volume. As an application, we study the problem of se-
lecting a prime broker among alternatives with different lending rates and margin requirements.
Moreover, we discuss how changing regulatory constraints affect the deposit rates offered for
illiquid loans.
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1 Introduction
Transaction costs and trading constraints are two central frictions in financial markets, but most
of the literature focuses either on transaction costs [16, 2, 5, 7, 18] or on portfolio constraints
[20, 10, 3] – separately – with the exception of the paper by Dai, Jin, and Liu [4]. They describe
the value function of a finite-horizon model with both frictions by means of a double-obstacle
problem, obtain some monotonicity properties of the optimal trading boundaries, and conduct an
extensive numerical analysis.
Our goal is to obtain more tractable results. To this end, we work with the infinite-horizon model
of Dumas and Luciano [7]: an investor with constant relative risk aversion trades to maximize the
long-term growth rate of her utility, in a market with one risky asset following geometric Brownian
motion and one safe asset with constant interest rate. In the presence of a binding exogenous
portfolio constraint, i.e., an upper bound on the risky weight, and proportional transaction costs,
we derive the optimal trading strategy as well as the associated welfare and trading volume. As in
the unconstrained case [8], all formulas are explicit in terms of the market and preference parameters
as well as an additional transaction cost gap, characterized as the root of a scalar equation. As the
spread becomes small, all quantities admit explicit asymptotic expansions, in terms of model and
preference parameters only.
These results help to clarify the joint impact of transaction costs and constraints.
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Constantinides [2] observed that – in the absence of constraints – “transaction costs have a first
order effect on asset demand”. On the other hand, he found that their welfare impact is typically less
pronounced, since “a small liquidity premium is sufficient to compensate an investor for deviating
significantly from the target portfolio proportions”. Starting with Shreve and Soner [18], these
numerical results have been made precise in an asymptotic manner: deviations from the optimal
frictionless portfolio are of order 1/3 as the spread  becomes small [13], but the corresponding
liquidity premium and utility loss are only of order 2/3 [18]. These results are robust within the
class of diffusion models [19], but break down in the presence of binding constraints. Here, we find
that the effects on portfolio composition and welfare are of the same order 1/2, in line with the
numerical observation of [4] that “transaction costs can have a first-order effect” on welfare.
In the absence of transaction costs, the impact of binding portfolio constraints is easily quan-
tified: harder constraints simply reduce the investor’s risky weight. Considering them jointly with
trading costs additionally allows to asses their impact on the share turnover the investor’s rebal-
ancing generates. The latter turns out to be of order −1/2, and therefore dominates its frictionless
counterpart of order −1/3 for sufficiently small spreads. The corresponding comparative statics
strongly depend on whether the investor’s position is leveraged or not. In the absence of leverage,
tighter constraints increase trading volume, and constrained turnover dominates its unconstrained
counterpart even for large transaction costs. On the contrary, if the optimal policy prescribes a
leveraged position in the risky asset, then sufficiently tight constraints reduce turnover, and uncon-
strained turnover need only be dominated for very small spreads.
Even though all individual asymptotic rates change compared to the unconstrained case, one
key observation from the unconstrained case [8] remains valid: The welfare impact of transaction
costs equals implied trading volume (measured consistently) times the spread, times a constant.
To illustrate the implications of our results, we discuss two applications. First, we consider an
investor choosing which prime broker to use to buy a leveraged risky position on margin. Each
broker is prepared to let the investor borrow at a specific rate and up to a given leverage constraint,
and our results allow to quantify the attractiveness of each combination. We find that among
those brokers that are equally attractive in the absence of transaction costs, the investor typically
prefers those with harder constraints (i.e., high margin requirements) and lower lending rates,
because transaction costs make highly leveraged portfolios less attractive than they appear to be in
frictionless markets. As a second application, we consider a bank that can borrow from its depositors
at the safe rate to provide long-term loans, whose book values are assumed to follow geometric
Brownian motion. Then, the bank’s optimization problem is precisely of the type considered
above, and the portfolio constraints correspond to the minimum capital requirements imposed by
regulatory authorities. This model can in turn be used to assess the impact of tighter regulatory
constraints: Assuming that the bank aims to achieve the same performance, it will have to decrease
its deposit rate to compensate for the negative welfare effect of harder constraints. The size of this
effect crucially depends on the liquidity of the long-term loans the bank is providing, i.e., on the
transaction costs incurred when prematurely liquidating them. Since leveraged positions are less
attractive with transaction costs, the decrease in the banks deposit rate is most pronounced in the
perfectly liquid case, and is diminished substantially if illiquidity is accounted for.
On a mathematical level, the proof of our verification theorem is based on applying a vari-
ant of the argument of Guasoni and Robertson [11] to a fictitious shadow price trading without
transaction costs, which is equivalent to the original market with transaction costs both in terms
of the optimal strategy and utility. In contrast to the unconstrained case [8], the dynamics of
the shadow price involve a singular component, such that the corresponding frictionless market is
not arbitrage-free. The constraints, however, prevent the optimal strategy from exploiting these
arbitrage opportunities.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the setting and states
the main results, whose implications are discussed in Section 3. The main results are derived
heuristically in Section 4, and proved rigorously in Section 5.
2 Model and Main Result
Consider a market with one safe asset S0t = e
rt, r > 0, and one risky asset, whose ask (buying)
price St follows geometric Brownian motion:
dSt/St = (µ+ r)dt+ σdWt, S0 ∈ (0,∞).
Here, µ > 0 is the expected excess return, σ > 0 the volatility, and (Wt)t≥0 is a Brownian motion.
The corresponding bid (selling) price is (1 − )St, where  ∈ (0, 1) represents the width of the
relative bid-ask spread.1
A self-financing trading strategy is an R2-valued, predictable process (φ0, φ) of finite variation:
(φ00−, φ0−) = (ξ0, ξ) ∈ R2 denotes the initial positions (in units) in the safe and risky asset, and
(φ0t , φt) denotes the positions held at time t. Writing φt = φ
↑
t − φ↓t as the difference between the
cumulative number of shares bought (φ↑t ) and sold (φ
↓
t ) by time t, the self-financing condition states
that the safe position only changes due to trades in the risky asset:
S0t dφ
0
t = −Stdφ↑t + (1− )Stdφ↓t , ∀t ≥ 0. (2.1)
As is customary, attention is restricted to strategies that remain solvent at all times. In addition,
we focus on strategies that satisfy an exogenous portfolio constraint, i.e., whose risky weight is
uniformly bounded from above.
Definition 2.1. A self-financing trading strategy (φ0, φ) is called admissible, if its liquidation value
is positive at all times,
Ξφt := φ
0
tS
0
t + (1− )Stφ+t − Stφ−t ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
and it satisfies the portfolio constraint
pit :=
φtSt
φ0tS
0
t + φtSt
≤ pimax, ∀t ≥ 0. (2.2)
It will sometimes be notationally convenient to decompose the constraint pimax in a multiplicative
manner as
pimax = κpi∗,
where
pi∗ = µ/γσ2
is the frictionless optimal Merton proportion and κ is the relative constraint. Throughout, the
constraints are assumed to be binding, i.e., pimax < pi∗ resp. κ < 1. Otherwise, they have no effect
as in the frictionless case if the transaction costs  are sufficiently small.
As in Dumas and Luciano [6] the investor has constant relative risk aversion 0 < γ 6= 1 and an
infinite planning horizon:
1This notation is equivalent to the usual setup with the same constant proportional transaction costs for purchases
and sales [5, 13, 18]. Indeed, set Sˇt =
2−
2
St and ˇ =

2− . Then ((1− )St, St) coincides with ((1− ˇ)Sˇt, (1 + ˇ)Sˇt).
Conversely, any bid-ask process ((1 − ˇ)Sˇt, (1 + ˇ)Sˇt) with ˇ ∈ (0, 1) equals ((1 − )St, St) for St = (1 + ˇ)Sˇt and
 = 2ˇ
1+ˇ
.
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Definition 2.2. An admissible strategy (ϕ0, ϕ) is called long-run optimal, if it maximizes the
equivalent safe rate
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
logE
[
(ΞϕT )
1−γ] 11−γ (2.3)
over all admissible strategies, where 0 < γ 6= 1 denotes the investor’s relative risk aversion.
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
Theorem 2.3. An investor with constant relative risk aversion 0 < γ 6= 1 trades to maximize the
equivalent safe rate in the presence of a binding portfolio constraint 0 < pimax = κpi∗ 6= 1.2
Then, for small transaction costs  > 0:
i) (Equivalent Safe Rate)
For the investor, trading the risky asset with transaction costs and portfolio constraints is
equivalent to leaving all wealth in a hypothetical safe asset, which pays the higher equivalent
safe rate
ESR = r +
µ2
2γσ2
(2κ/(1− λ)− κ2)(1− λ)2,
where the gap λ is defined in Item iv) below.
ii) (Liquidity Premium)
Trading the risky asset with transaction costs and constraints is equivalent to trading a hypo-
thetical asset with no transaction cost and no constraint, with the same volatility σ, but with
lower expected excess return µ
√
2κ/(1− λ)− κ2(1− λ). Thus, the liquidity premium is
LiPr = µ− µ
√
2κ/(1− λ)− κ2(1− λ).
iii) (Trading Policy)
It is optimal to keep the risky weight (in terms of the ask price) between the buying and selling
boundaries
pi− = (1− λ)pimax, pi+ = pimax.
iv) (Gap)
λ is the unique value for which the solution of the initial value problem
0 = w′(x) + (1− γ)w(x)2 + (2µ
σ2
− 1)w(x)− µ2
γσ4
(1− (1− κ(1− λ))2),
w(0) = (1− λ)pimax,
also satisfies the terminal value condition
w (log (u/l(λ))) = pimax(1−)(1−pimax)+pimax(1−) =: w+,
where
u/l(λ) = pimax/(1−pimax)(1−λ)pimax/(1−(1−λ)pimax) .
2In the degenerate case pimax = κpi∗ = 1, an optimal strategy is to fully invest into the risky asset initially and
never trade again afterwards. Both share and wealth turnover vanish in this case, and the equivalent safe rate and
liquidity premium coincide with their counterparts in the absence of transaction costs.
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v) (Share Turnover)
Share Turnover, defined as shares traded d‖ϕ‖t = dϕ↑t + dϕ↓t divided by shares held |ϕt|, has
the long-term average:
ShTu := lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
d‖ϕ‖t
|ϕt| =

σ2
2
(
2µ
σ2
− 1
)(
1−pi−
(u/l(λ))
2µ
σ2
−1−1
− 1−w+
(u/l(λ))
1− 2µ
σ2 −1
)
, if µ 6= σ22 ,
σ2
2 log (u/l(λ)) (1− pi− + 1− w+) , if µ = σ
2
2 .
vi) (Wealth Turnover)
Wealth Turnover, defined as wealth traded divided by wealth held, has the long-term average:
WeTu := lim
T→∞
1
T
(∫ T
0
Stdϕ
↑
t
ϕ0tS
0
t + ϕtSt
+
∫ T
0
(1− )Stdϕ↓t
ϕ0tS
0
t + ϕt(1− )St
)
=

σ2
2
(
2µ
σ2
− 1
)(
pi−(1−pi−)
(u/l(λ))
2µ
σ2
−1−1
− w+(1−w+)
(u/l(λ))
1− 2µ
σ2 −1
)
, if µ 6= σ22 ,
σ2
2 log (u/l(λ)) (pi−(1− pi−) + w+(1− w+)) , if µ = σ
2
2 .
vii) (Asymptotics)
The following asymptotic expansions hold true as  ↓ 0:3
ESR = r +
µ2
2γσ2
(
2pimax
pi∗
−
(
pimax
pi∗
)2)
− γσ2
(
1
γ
(pi∗ − pimax)(1− pimax)2pi2max
)1/2
1/2 +O(),
LiPr = µ
1−
√
2pimax
pi∗
−
(
pimax
pi∗
)2+ γσ2(1
γ
pimax(pi∗ − pimax)(1− pimax)2
2pi∗ − pimax
)1/2
1/2 +O(),
pi− = pimax −
(
1
γ
pi2max
pi∗ − pimax (1− pimax)
2
)1/2
1/2 +O(),
λ =
(
1
γ
(1− pimax)2
pi∗ − pimax
)1/2
1/2 +O(),
ShTu = γσ2
(
1
γ
(pi∗ − pimax)(1− pimax)2
)1/2
−1/2 +O(1),
WeTu = γσ2
(
1
γ
(pi∗ − pimax)(1− pimax)2pi2max
)1/2
−1/2 +O(1).
As in the absence of constraints, the stationary policy from Theorem 2.3 is also approximately
optimal – at the leading order 1/2 for small transaction costs  – for any finite time horizon:
Theorem 2.4. Fix a time horizon T > 0. Then, the finite-horizon equivalent safe rate of any
admissible strategy (ψ0, ψ) satisfies the upper bound
1
T
logE[(ΞψT )
1−γ ]
1
1−γ ≤ ESR + 1
T
log (ξ00− + ξ0−S0) +O () .
3Notice that κ and pimax/pi∗ are used interchangeably to ease the computations for the comparative statics.
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The finite-horizon equivalent safe rate of the long-run optimal strategy (ϕ0, ϕ) from Theorem 2.3
satisfies the lower bound
1
T
logE[(ΞϕT )
1−γ ]
1
1−γ ≥ ESR + 1
T
log (ξ00− + ξ0−S0) +O () .
As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the finite horizon bounds in Theorem 2.4 also show
that the policy from Theorem 2.3 maximizes (2.3) if the limes inferior is replaced by a limes superior.
3 Implications
Let us now discuss some of the implications of our main result.
3.1 Asset Demand and Welfare
In the absence of constraints, the impact of transaction costs on the optimal policy is large (∼ 1/3,
cf. [13]) whereas their effect on welfare is small (∼ 2/3, cf. [18]), both in accordance with the
numerical observations of Constantinides [2]. With binding constraints, this no longer holds true:
Both effects turn out to be proportional to the square-root 1/2 of the spread, making precise the
observation of [4] that transaction costs can have a first-order effect on welfare. The reason is that
investors, if unconstrained, would like to hold larger risky positions then they are allowed to and
therefore are more reluctant to tolerate downward swings of their risky position. This leads to a
smaller no-trade region and hence, due to larger trading costs, to a bigger welfare impact.
More formally, this can also be rationalized by adapting the argument of Rogers [17]. He
argued that the losses per unit time due to transaction costs are proportional to the local time of
a reflected Brownian motion and hence of order /x, where x denotes the length of the no-trade
region. This reasoning only depends on the width of the no-trade region and hence remains valid
also in the presence of constraints. What changes is the displacement loss due to deviating from the
frictionless optimal policy. In the absence of constraints, the optimal frictionless Merton proportion
pi∗ lies in the no-trade region [pi−, pi+].4 Consequently, the value function behaves like (pi − pi∗)2
near the maximum pi∗ according to Taylor’s theorem, leading to losses of order x2 per unit time
due to suboptimal portfolio composition. Minimizing the total loss then leads to x ∼ 1/3 and a
welfare loss ∼ 2/3. In the presence of binding constraints, the frictionless minimizer no longer lies
in the no-trade region; consequently, the value function behaves linearly leading to losses of order
x. Again minimizing the total loss gives x ∼ 1/2 and a welfare loss of the same order.
For small transaction costs, it is possible to determine the comparative statics of the width of
the no-trade region for varying constraint levels by analyzing the leading term in the asymptotic
expansion. The above argument that investors constrained from above only tolerate smaller down-
ward moves of their risky weight suggests that harder constraints should lead to a smaller no-trade
region. This intuitive reasoning is indeed true almost generically, i.e., unless the unconstrained fric-
tionless risky weight lies too close to unity.5 In all other cases the intuition that harder constraints
lead to a smaller no-trade region indeed holds true at the leading order. Using the exact solution
for λ Figure 1 depicts the length of the no-trade region against the bid-ask spread and confirms
the asymptotic result.
4Note that this need not hold for leveraged positions if transaction costs are sufficiently large [18, p. 675], but is
always true if the transaction costs are small enough (compare [13, p. 182]).
5In the degenerate case pi∗ = 1, it is optimal to invest in a full risky position initially, and then hold the latter
without further trades. Hence, the unconstrained no-trade region vanishes, but its width is increased by any non-
trivial constraints. For unconstrained frictionless weights close enough to one (pi∗ ∈ [0.93, 1.25]) imposing constraints
can similarly still increase the width of the no-trade region.
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Figure 1: Left panel: Length of the no-trade region (vertical axis) plotted against the bid-ask
spread  (horizontal axis) for an unconstrained weight pi∗ = 62.5% without leverage (solid), and
with constraints pimax = 50% (dashed) and 40% (dotted). Right panel: Length of the no-trade
region against the spread for an unconstrained weight of pi∗ = 390% with leverage (solid), and with
constraints pimax = 225% (dashed) and 175% (dotted). Model parameters are µ = 8%, σ = 16%
and risk aversion is γ = 5 resp. γ = 0.8.
3.2 Trading Volume
In the frictionless case, the impact of binding constraints is simple: They reduce the investor’s
risky position. The present setting with transaction costs also allows to quantify their effect on the
implied trading volume, which shows a more involved picture. Indeed, two competing effects are
at work here: On the one hand, the constraints reduce the investor’s risky position, thereby also
reducing the amount of rebalancing necessary to keep the risky weight in the no-trade region. On the
other hand, additional trading is required as the constraints (typically) lead to a smaller no-trade
region. Our asymptotic results show that as the spread becomes small the latter effect prevails:
The smaller no-trade region leads to share and wealth turnovers of order −1/2, in contrast to the
rate −1/3 observed in the unconstrained case [8]. That is, for sufficiently small spreads, investors
trade more in the presence of binding constraints.
The comparative statics of share turnover for small costs can again be analyzed by means of the
leading term in the asymptotic expansion. In the no-leverage case pi∗ ∈ (0, 1), harder constraints
not only (typically) decrease the width of the no-trade region but also move the risky weight away
from the degenerate buy-and-hold strategy obtained for pi∗ = 1. Consequently, at the leading
order −1/2, harder constraints always imply increased share turnover in this case. In contrast,
the situation is ambiguous in the leverage case. On the one hand, harder constraints decrease
the width of the no-trade region, thereby increasing turnover. On the other hand, however, they
decrease turnover by pulling the risky weight closer to the buy-and-hold level. For sufficiently hard
constraints (pimax ∈ [1, 1+2pi∗3 )) the latter effect prevails, decreasing turnover, and vice versa for
pimax >
1+2pi∗
3 .
Since all of these results only hold true asymptotically as the spread  becomes small, it is
interesting to compare them with their exact counterparts, obtained by numerically solving for
the gap λ. The results are reported in Figure 2. In the absence of leverage for the frictionless
weight pi∗, there is perfect agreement with the asymptotic results: Turnover is increasing with
harder constraints, and larger than in the unconstrained case. In the leverage case, however, the
situation is less clear-cut. The comparative statics again match the asymptotic results: Both
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Figure 2: Left panel: Share turnover (vertical axis, annual fractions traded) plotted against the
bid-ask spread  (horizontal axis) for an unconstrained weight pi∗ = 62.5% without leverage (solid),
and with constraints pimax = 50% (dashed) and 40% (dotted). Right panel: Share turnover against
the spread for an unconstrained weight of pi∗ = 390% with leverage (solid), and with constraints
pimax = 225% (dashed) and 175% (dotted). Model parameters are µ = 8%, σ = 16% and risk
aversion is γ = 5 resp. γ = 0.8.
constraints lie in the domain where harder constraints decrease turnover asymptotically, matching
the numerical results. Compared to the unconstrained case, however, we observe that very low
levels of transaction costs may be needed for the constrained turnover to surpass its unconstrained
counterpart, in particular, for tight constraints.
The corresponding results for wealth turnover are more involved and are omitted for brevity.
3.3 Turnover, Spreads, and Liquidity Premia
In a model with transaction costs but without constraints, Gerhold et al. [8] pointed out the
following connection between the welfare impact of small transaction costs and the turnover implied
by the optimal strategy:6(
r +
µ2
2γσ2
)
− ESR ∼ 3
4
WeTu and LiPr ∼ 3
4
ShTu . (3.1)
The interpretation is that the unobservable welfare effect of small transaction costs is approximately
equal to a product of observables: trading volume, times the bid-ask spread, times a universal
constant. This shows that the comparative statics of both quantities coincide, and allows to estimate
liquidity premia from data on trading volume.
In the presence of binding constraints, the asymptotic rates of all involved quantities change.
On the contrary, the link (3.1) between them remains valid, up to changing the constants. To see
this, first note that in the presence of the constraint but without transaction costs, the equivalent
safe rate is given by r + µ
2
2γσ2
(2pimaxpi∗ − (pimaxpi∗ )2). The additional reduction due to small transaction
costs is therefore approximately equal to:
r +
µ2
2γσ2
(
2pimax
pi∗
−
(
pimax
pi∗
)2)
− ESR ∼ γσ2
(
1
γ
(pi∗ − pimax)(1− pimax)2pi2max
)1/2
1/2.
6Here, both quantities have to be measured consistently, either focusing on the risky asset (liquidity premium and
share turnover) or on the whole market (equivalent safe rate and wealth turnover).
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Figure 3: Left panel: Liquidity premium for transaction costs LiPrT (vertical axis) plotted against
the bid-ask spread  (horizontal axis) for an unconstrained weight pi∗ = 62.5% without leverage
(solid), and with constraints pimax = 50% (dashed) and 40% (dotted). Right panel: LiPr
T against
the spread for an unconstrained weight of pi∗ = 390% with leverage (solid), and with constraints
pimax = 225% (dashed) and 175% (dotted). Model parameters are µ = 8%, σ = 16% and risk
aversion is γ = 5 resp. γ = 0.8.
In view of the asymptotic expansion for wealth turnover, this shows that the extra impact of
transaction costs on the equivalent safe rate remains proportional to wealth turnover times the
spread, also in the constrained case:
r +
µ2
2γσ2
(
2pimax
pi∗
−
(
pimax
pi∗
)2)
− ESR ∼ WeTu .
Similarly, notice that the total liquidity premium LiPr in Theorem 2.3 can be asymptotically
decomposed into the liquidity premia LiPrC and LiPrT required to compensate for the constraints
alone and the additional effect of the transaction costs:
LiPr ∼ µ
(
1−
√
2pimaxpi∗ − (pimaxpi∗ )2
)
+ γσ2
(
1
γ
pimax(pi∗−pimax)(1−pimax)2
2pi∗−pimax
)1/2
1/2 := LiPrC + LiPrT .
With this notation, we obtain the following analogue of the second relation in (3.1):
LiPrT ∼
(
pimax
2pi∗ − pimax
)1/2
ShTu .
Hence, this result is also robust to the additional portfolio constraints, up to one important caveat.
Unlike for wealth turnover and the equivalent safe rate above, the constant linking share turnover
and the liquidity premium accrued due to transaction costs depends on the constraints, thereby
leading to different comparative statics. Indeed, whereas the leading term of share turnover is
always increasing with harder constraints in the absence of leverage, pi∗ ∈ (0, 1), the effect on the
liquidity premium can be ambiguous due the presence of the extra factor [pimax/(2pi∗ − pimax)]1/2,
which is decreasing with harder constraints. This is in line with the numerical observation of [4]
that “the liquidity premium can be higher even though position limits are less binding”. Whereas
this may or may not be the case in the absence of leverage, it is in fact the generic situation for a
leveraged position pi∗ > 1 and constraints pimax ∈ [1, 1+2pi∗3 ).
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Figure 4: Left panel: Total liquidity premium LiPr (vertical axis) plotted against the bid-ask
spread  (horizontal axis) for an unconstrained weight pi∗ = 62.5% without leverage (solid), and
with constraints pimax = 50% (dashed) and 40% (dotted). Right panel: LiPr against the spread for
an unconstrained weight of pi∗ = 390% with leverage (solid), and with constraints pimax = 225%
(dashed) and 175% (dotted). Model parameters are µ = 8%, σ = 16% and risk aversion is γ = 5
resp. γ = 0.8.
These results are illustrated in Figure 3, where the liquidity premia LiPrT due to transaction
costs are plotted against the spread in the unconstrained case and for two binding constraints. In
the no-leverage regime depicted in the left panel, the constrained liquidity premia dominate their
unconstrained counterparts for all levels of transaction costs, in line with the larger asymptotic rate.
Moreover, the liquidity premium increases with tighter constraints, in accordance the asymptotic
comparative statics. These also predict the correct effect in the leverage case reported in the
right panel. Here, pimax ∈ [1, 1+2pi∗3 ) such that the leading-order terms of the liquidity premia are
decreasing with tighter constraints, which matches the numerical results. Analogously as for share
turnover, however, the constrained liquidity premium only dominates the unconstrained one for
sufficiently low transaction costs and not for arbitrary levels like in the unleveraged case.
Since the total liquidity premium LiPr measures the joint impact of constraints and transaction
costs, it is interesting to discriminate between the relative contributions of these two market fric-
tions. Figure 4 depicts the total liquidity premia for the same examples as before. Evidently, the
impact of the transaction costs is larger in the leverage case, as in the absence of constraints [8],
but the effect is diminished severely as the constraints bind harder. In contrast, the transaction
costs have a much bigger influence than in the unconstrained case in the absence of leverage.
3.4 Applications
Selection of Prime Brokers
Consider an investor choosing which prime broker to use to buy a leveraged risky position on
margin. Each broker is willing let the investor borrow from him at a lending rate r > 0 and up to
a leverage constraint pimax > 1,
7 thereby allowing the investor to trade in a market with safe rate
r, excess return µ¯− r of the risky asset (µ¯ denotes the total return), and leverage constraint pimax.
7Put differently, the broker’s margin requirement is 1/pimax.
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Figure 5: Left panel: 10% equivalent safe rate indifference curve without transaction cost plotted
against the interest rate r (vertical axis) and the constrained weight pimax (horizontal axis, the
corresponding unconstrained weight is 271%). Right panel: Leading-order loss in equivalent safe
rate due to transaction costs  = 1% plotted against the constrained weight pimax with an interest
rate r such that the equivalent safe rate without transaction cost is always 10% . Model parameters
are µ¯ = 8%, σ = 16%, and risk aversion is γ = 0.8.
Without transaction costs, the same equivalent safe rate esr can be achieved if
r =
2pimaxµ¯− 2esr− pi2maxγσ2
2(pimax − 1) . (3.2)
That is, all pairs (r, pimax) satisfying this relation lie on the same iso-utility curve for the investor,
since the effect of having to pay a higher lending rate is precisely offset by the opportunity to
borrow a larger amount for investing. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
With transaction costs, the investor is no longer indifferent between these different brokers, and
our model allows to asses which combinations are more attractive if the respective rebalancing costs
are taken into account. Indeed, for pairs (r, pimax) satisfying (3.2), the equivalent safe rate with
transaction costs is given by
esr−
(
σ2
2
pi2max(pimax − 1)(2esr− 2µ¯− (pimax − 2)pimaxγσ2)
)1/2
1/2 +O(ε).
If pimax = 1, the investor follows a buy-and-hold strategy and the transaction costs have no impact.
As the constraint becomes softer, the effect of transaction costs increases, reaches its maximum at a
critical level picmax and then decreases again, vanishing at the leading order 
1/2 as the constraint pimax
tends towards the frictionless Merton proportion pi∗ = (µ¯− r)/γσ2.8 Consequently, for sufficiently
hard constraints, the investor prefers tighter constraints and lower lending rates to softer constraints
and higher lending rates, but the picture is reversed for sufficiently soft constraints, as illustrated
in Figure 5.
The above leading-order analysis neglects that the effect of transaction costs does not vanish
exactly as the constraint approaches the Merton proportion; only the leading term of order 1/2
tends to zero. More precisely, it is replaced by a nontrivial term of order 2/3 in the limit. Hence,
portfolios with soft constraints are in fact less attractive than suggested by the above analysis. This
8For this value, the welfare impact of transaction costs is only of order 2/3 as in the unconstrained case [8].
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Figure 6: Exact (solid) and approximate equivalent safe rate (dotted) with transaction costs
(vertical axis, left panel: 1%, right panel: 0.1%) plotted against the constrained weight pimax with
an interest rate r such that the equivalent safe rate without transaction cost is always 10% . Model
parameters are µ¯ = 8%, σ = 16%, pimax = 271% and risk aversion is γ = 0.8.
is illustrated in Figure 6, which compares the exact and leading-order equivalent safe rates that
can be obtained with pairs (r, pimax) satisfying (3.2). Whereas the approximation recaptures the
qualitative properties of the exact quantity rather well, it severely overestimates the attractiveness
of brokers with a soft leverage constraint (i.e., a low margin requirement) and a high lending
rate. With the exact quantities, it turns out that the investor typically9 prefers tighter leverage
constraints and lower lending rates, as transaction costs make highly leveraged positions relatively
less attractive than they appear to be in frictionless markets.
Illiquid Loans and Deposit Rates
The application in the previous section can also be reinterpreted as follows. Consider a bank,
who can borrow from its depositors at a safe rate r to provide illiquid (long-term) loans, whose
book values are assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion with constant drift µ¯ and volatility
σ. To limit excessive risk-taking, regulating authorities restrict the amount of leverage financial
institutions are allowed to use by setting minimal capital requirements, which correspond to the
portfolio constraints in our model.
This setting allows to study how the deposit rates offered by the bank react to harder regulatory
constraints. The idea is that the bank will try to achieve the same performance (measured in terms
of the equivalent safe rate) with the new constraints. Since tightening the constraints reduces the
equivalent safe rate, this means that the bank will decrease its deposit rate. In the absence of
transaction costs, i.e., for loans that can be liquidated at their book values, the new deposit rate
can be obtained using Formula (3.2). However, most long-term loans are not very liquid, incurring
substantial transaction costs when liquidated prior to maturity. The corresponding change in the
deposit rate can in turn be determined by numerically solving for the safe rate in Theorem 2.3 that
makes the equivalent safe rate with the new constraint coincide with its counterpart for the old
constraint and the old deposit rate.
The results for a concrete example are provided in Table 1. In the literature, banks are often
modeled as risk-neutral, simply maximizing the present value of future cash flows. Therefore, we
also use a low risk aversion (γ = 0.1) here. As the transaction costs incurred when prematurely
9That is, unless the constraints are barely binding.
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Constrained weights pimax Transaction Costs  Deposit Rates r corresponding ESR
220%
0% 5.82% 10%
0.1% 5.82% 9.84%
1% 5.82% 9.54%
10% 5.82% 8.86%
180%
0% 4.98% 10%
0.1% 5.05% 9.84%
1% 5.16% 9.54%
10% 5.43% 8.86%
150%
0% 3.42% 10%
0.1% 3.60% 9.84%
1% 3.93% 9.54%
10% 4.68% 8.86%
Table 1: Changes in deposit rates r due to a decrease of the upper bound of the risky weight from
220% to 180% resp. to 150%, in order to retain the initial level of the equivalent safe rate. Model
parameters are µ¯ = 0.08, σ = 16% and risk aversion is γ = 0.1.
liquidating long-term loans are substantial (in particular, compared to the bid-ask spreads observed
for equities), we report results for a relative bid-ask spread of up to 10%. It turns out that harder
regulatory constraints decrease the deposit rates the most if the long-term loans the bank provides
are assumed to be perfectly liquid. If illiquidity is taken into account, then highly leveraged
positions are less attractive, and a substantially smaller reduction of the deposit rate is required to
compensate the bank for the tighter constraints.
4 Heuristics
In this section, we use methods from stochastic control to heuristically derive a candidate solution.
Fix an upper bound 0 < pimax = κpi∗ 6= 1 on the investor’s risky weight and consider the
problem of maximizing the expected power utility U(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ) from terminal wealth at
time T . Denote by V (t,X0t , Xt) its value function, which is assumed to depend on time as well as
the positions X0 = ϕ0S0 in the safe and X = ϕS in the risky asset, evaluated in terms of the ask
price. Then, by Itoˆ’s formula and the self-financing condition (2.1):
dV (t,X0t , Xt) =
(
Vt + rX
0
t Vx + (µ+ r)XtVy +
σ2
2 X
2
t Vyy
)
dt+ σXtVydWt
+ St(Vy − Vx)dϕ↑t + St((1− )Vx − Vy)dϕ↓t ,
where the arguments are omitted for brevity. By the martingale optimality principle, this process
has to be a supermartingale for any strategy, and a martingale for the optimizer, leading to the
HJB equation:
Vt + rX
0
t Vx + (µ+ r)XtVy +
σ2
2
X2t Vyy = 0, if 1 <
Vx
Vy
<
1
1−  .
The homotheticity of the value function and the observation that – in the long-run – the value
function should grow exponentially with the horizon at a constant rate r+ β suggest the following
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representation:10
V (t,X0t , Xt) = (X
0
t )
1−γv(Xt/X0t )e
−(1−γ)(r+β)t.
Setting z := y/x the HJB equation becomes
σ2
2
z2v′′(z) + µzv′(z)− (1− γ)βv(z) = 0, if 1 + z < (1− γ)v(z)
v′(z)
<
1
1−  + z.
The set {z : 1 + z < (1−γ)v(z)v′(z) < 11− + z} corresponds to those values of the stock-cash ratio X/X0
for which the optimal strategy does not move, i.e., the no-trade region. To simplify further, assume
that it is given by an interval l < z < u, where the lower boundary l is an unknown parameter and
the upper boundary u coincides with the constraint, u = pimax/(1−pimax).11 Then, one obtains the
following system with one free boundary:
z2v′′(z)σ2/2 + µzv′(z)− (1− γ)βv(z) = 0, if l < z < u, (4.1)
(1 + l)v′(l)− (1− γ)v(l) = 0, (4.2)
(1/(1− ) + u) v′(u)− (1− γ)v(u) = 0. (4.3)
These conditions do not suffice to identify the solution, since the ODE (4.1) is of order two and the
conditions (4.2) and (4.3) can be matched for any choice of the buying boundary l. The optimal
buying boundary l is the one that additionally satisfies a smooth pasting condition [6], obtained
by formally differentiating (4.2):12
(1 + l)v′′(l) + γv′(l) = 0. (4.4)
Substituting (4.4) and (4.2) into (4.1) yields
− σ
2γ
2
(
l
1 + l
)2
+ µ
l
1 + l
− β = 0. (4.5)
The smaller solution of this quadratic equation determines the lower buying boundary:
pi− =
l
1 + l
=
µ
γσ2
−
√
µ2 − 2βγσ2
γσ2
.
Set pi− = (1− λ)pimax = (1− λ)κpi∗ for some λ > 0. Then, the growth rate β can be written as
β =
µ2
2γσ2
(1− (1− κ(1− λ))2).
λ is called the gap, because it describes the deviation of the frictional buying boundary and growth
rate from their frictionless counterparts. Since the buying boundary is determined by λ, the above
free-boundary value problem becomes a fixed-boundary value problem with free parameter λ in
this notation. The substitution
v(z) = e(1−γ)
∫ log (z/l(λ))
0 w(y)dy, i.e., w(y) =
l(λ)eyv′(l(λ)ey)
(1− γ)v(l(λ)ey) ,
10This representation is valid if the position in the safe asset is non-negative at all times. In the leverage case
pimax > 1 one has to factor out −X0t instead of X0t , leading to analogous calculations.
11Without constraints and transaction costs, the investor would hold an even larger risky weight. Therefore it is
natural to assume that the upper selling boundary coincides with the highest value compatible with the constraints.
12Here, “smooth” means C2 across the boundary. Note that this need not hold at the upper selling boundary, since
the latter is fixed by the constraints.
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in turn reduces it to a Riccati ODE:
0 = w′(x) + (1− γ)w(x)2 + (2µ
σ2
− 1)w(x)− µ2
γσ4
(1− (1−κ(1−λ))2), x ∈ [0, log (u/l(λ))] , (4.6)
with boundary conditions
w(0) =
l(λ)
1 + l(λ)
= (1− λ)pimax, (4.7)
w
(
log
(
u
l(λ)
))
=
u(1− )
1 + u(1− ) =
pimax(1− )
(1− pimax) + pimax(1− ) , (4.8)
where
u
l(λ)
=
pimax/(1− pimax)
pi−(λ)/(1− pi−(λ)) =
pimax/(1− pimax)
(1− λ)pimax/(1− (1− λ)pimax) . (4.9)
Since the Riccati ODE is of order one, the initial condition (4.7) uniquely determines a solution
w(λ, ·) for any choice of λ. The correct one is then identified by the terminal condition (4.8). Even
though the Riccati ODE (4.6)-(4.7) can be solved explicitly (cf. Lemma 5.1), it is not possible to
solve for λ in closed form. However, the implicit function theorem readily yields a fractional power
series expansion in ε (cf. Lemma 5.2), which in turn immediately provides the asymptotics for the
buying boundary pi− = (1− λ)pimax and the growth rate β = µ22γσ2 (1− (1− κ(1− λ))2).
5 Proofs
5.1 Explicit Formulae and their Properties
The first step towards a rigorous verification theorem is to determine an explicit expression for the
solution of the Riccati ODE (4.6) with initial condition (4.7), given a sufficiently small λ > 0.
Lemma 5.1. Let 0 < pimax = κpi∗ 6= 1 and define w(λ, ·) by
w(λ, x) :=

a(λ) tanh (tanh−1 (b(λ)/a(λ))−a(λ)x)+µ/σ2−1/2
γ−1 ,
if γ ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < pimax < 1, or γ > 1 and pimax > 1,
a(λ) tan (tan−1 (b(λ)/a(λ))+a(λ)x)+µ/σ2−1/2
γ−1 ,
if γ > 1 and pimax ∈
(
1/κ−
√
(1−1/γ)(2/κ−1)
2(γ/κ2−(γ−1)(2/κ−1)) ,
1/κ+
√
(1−1/γ)(2/κ−1)
2(γ/κ2−(γ−1)(2/κ−1))
)
,
a(λ) coth (coth−1 (b(λ)/a(λ))−a(λ)x)+µ/σ2−1/2
γ−1 ,
otherwise,
with
a(λ) :=
√√√√∣∣∣∣∣(γ − 1) µ2γσ4 (1− (1− κ(1− λ))2)−
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2∣∣∣∣∣,
b(λ) :=
1
2
− µ
σ2
+ (γ − 1)pimax(1− λ).
Then, for a sufficiently small λ > 0, the mapping x 7→ w(λ, x) is a local solution of
0 = w′(x) + (1− γ)w(x)2 + (2µ
σ2
− 1)w(x)− µ2
γσ4
(1− (1− κ(1− λ))2),
w(0) = (1− λ)pimax. (5.1)
Moreover, x 7→ w(λ, x) is increasing for 0 < pimax < 1 and decreasing for pimax > 1.
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Proof. The first part of the assertion is readily verified by taking derivatives. The second follows
by inspection of the explicit formulae.
Next, we establish that the crucial constant λ, which determines both the no-trade region and
the equivalent safe rate, is well-defined.
Lemma 5.2. Let 0 < pimax = κpi∗ 6= 1, define w (λ, ·) as in Lemma 5.1, and set
l(λ) =
(1− λ)pimax
1− (1− λ)pimax and u =
pimax
1− pimax . (5.2)
Then, for a sufficiently small , there exists a unique solution λ of
w (λ, log (u/l(λ))) =
pimax(1− )
(1− pimax) + pimax(1− ) =: w+. (5.3)
As  ↓ 0, it has the asymptotic expansion
λ =
(
1
γ
κ
1− κ
(1− pimax)2
pimax
)1/2
1/2 +O().
Proof. With minor modifications, this follows as in [8, Lemma B.2]
Henceforth, λ denotes the quantity from Lemma 5.2, and we omit the λ-dependence of a =
a(λ), b = b(λ), l = l(λ), and w(x) = w(λ, x).
Corollary 5.3. Let 0 < pimax 6= 1 and suppose  is sufficiently small. Then, in all three cases,
w′(0) = pi−(1− pi−) (5.4)
w′ (log (u/l)) ≤ w+(1− w+). (5.5)
Proof. The assertions follow from the ODE for w and its boundary conditions in Lemma 5.1 and
Lemma 5.2.
5.2 Shadow Prices and Verification
A key idea for the proof of our verification theorem is to replace the original bid and ask prices by
a single fictitious “shadow price” S˜ evolving within the bid-ask spread, which admits an optimal
policy that is feasible (and hence also optimal) in the original market with transaction costs, too.
An approach of this kind was first used in [14], and has been utilized in the present setting modulo
constraints by [8].
Definition 5.4. A shadow price is a process S˜ lying within the bid-ask spread [(1 − )S, S], such
that there exists a corresponding long-run optimal strategy (ϕ0, ϕ) of finite variation that satisfies
the portfolio constraint (2.2) and only entails buying (resp. selling) the risky asset when S˜ equals
the buying (resp. selling) price.
The original constraints can be translated as follows:
Remark 5.5. Let S˜ be a price process evolving within the bid ask spread [(1 − )S, S]. Then if a
strategy (φ0, φ) satisfies the original portfolio constraint pit ≤ pimax on the risky weight computed
with the ask price S, it also satisfies the following constraint on the risky weight computed with S˜:
p˜it ≤ p˜imax :=
{
pimax, if pimax ≤ 1,
pimax(1−)
(1−pimax)+pimax(1−) , otherwise.
(5.6)
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The construction successfully used in [15, 1, 12] suggests that the discounted shadow price can
be constructed as the marginal rate of substitution of risky for safe assets for the optimal investor,
i.e., as the ratio of the partial derivatives of the value function with respect to the numbers of
shares in the risky and safe asset, respectively:
S˜t
S0t
=
∂ϕtV (t,X
0
t , Xt)
∂ϕ0tV (t,X
0
t , Xt)
.
With the candidate value function derived in the above section, this leads to the candidate shadow
price
S˜t = St
w
(
log (Xt/X
0
t l)
)
Xt/X0t [1− w
(
log (Xt/(X0t l))
)
]
= St
w (Yt)
leYt(1− w (Yt)) , (5.7)
where eYt = (Xt/X
0
t l) is the ratio between the risky and safe positions at the ask price St, centered
at the buying boundary l = (1−λ)pimax1−(1−λ)pimax . In view of the above heuristics, the stock-cash ratio X/X
0
should remain within the no-trade region [l, u]; consequently, Y should take values in [0, log(u/l)]
(resp. [log (u/l), 0], if pimax > 1). In the interior of this interval, the number of risky assets should
remain constant, so that the dynamics of Y = logϕ/(lϕ0) + logS/S0 coincide with those of the
Brownian motion logS/S0, which needs to be reflected at the boundaries to remain in [0, log(u/l)].
These heuristic arguments motivate to define the process Y as Brownian motion with instan-
taneous reflection at 0 and log(u/l):
dYt = (µ− σ2/2)dt+ σdWt + dLt − dUt, (5.8)
where the local time processes L and U are adapted, continuous, non-decreasing (resp. non-
increasing, if pimax > 1) and only increase (resp. decrease, if pimax > 1) on the sets {Yt = 0} and
{Yt = log (u/l)}, respectively. The process S˜ can then be defined in accordance with (5.7):
Lemma 5.6. Define
y =

0, if lξ0S00 ≥ ξS0,
log (u/l), if uξ0S00 ≤ ξS0,
log
[
ξS0/(ξ
0S00 l)
]
, otherwise.
(5.9)
and let Y be defined as in (5.8), starting at Y0 = y. Then, S˜ = S
w(Y )
leY (1−w(Y )) , with w as in
Lemma 5.1, has the dynamics
dS˜(Yt)
S˜(Yt)
= (µ˜(Yt) + r) dt+ σ˜(Yt)dWt +
(
1− w
′
(1− w)w
(
log
(u
l
)))
dUt,
where µ˜(·) and σ˜(·) are given by
µ˜(y) =
σ2w′(y)
w(y)(1− w(y))
(
w′(y)
1− w(y) − (1− γ)w(y)
)
, σ˜(y) =
σw′ (y)
w(y)(1− w(y)) .
Moreover, the process S˜ takes values within the bid-ask spread [(1− )S, S].
Note that the first two cases in (5.9) arise if the initial stock-cash ratio ξS0/(ξ
0S00) lies outside
of the interval [l, u]. Then, a jump from the initial position (ϕ00− , ϕ0−) = (ξ
0, ξ) to the nearest
boundary value of [l, u] is required. This transfer necessitates the purchase resp. sale of the risky
asset and hence the initial price S˜0 is defined to match the buying resp. selling price of the risky
asset.
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Proof. The dynamics of S˜ result from Itoˆ’s formula, the dynamics of Y , and the identity
w′′(y) = −2(1− γ)w′(y)w(y)− (2µ/σ2 − 1)w′(y), (5.10)
which is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.1. In addition, the boundary conditions for w and w′
imply that
w′′(0)− w′(0) + 2w(0)w′(0) = 2w′(0)(γw(0)− µ
σ2
)
= 2pimax(1− λ)(1− pimax(1− λ)) µ
σ2
(κ(1− λ)− 1)
is negative (resp. positive, if pimax > 1). Thus, a comparison argument yields that the derivative
of the function η : y 7→ w(y)ley(1−w(y)) is negative (resp. positive, if pimax > 1). Taking into account
w(0)
l(1−w(0)) = 1 and
w(log (u/l))
u(1−w(log (u/l))) = 1−  completes the proof.
Unlike in the absence of constraints, the dynamics of S˜ involve a singular part, such that the
shadow market is no longer arbitrage-free. Indeed, whenever S˜ hits the lower bid price (1−ε)S it is
reflected upwards, such that one can make a riskless profit by buying risky assets and immediately
selling them after the reflection has taken place.
Due to the constraints (2.2), however, such arbitrage opportunities cannot be scaled arbitrar-
ily. Consequently, there exists a discount factor that turns all admissible wealth processes into
supermartingales (compare [3]):
Lemma 5.7. For a fixed time horizon T , denote by X˜ψT the shadow payoff of an admissible strategy
(ψ0, ψ) in the frictionless shadow market (S0, S˜), satisfying the constraint (2.2) and hence also the
shadow constraint p˜iψ ≤ p˜imax from Remark 5.5. Define the process M˜ by
M˜t := e
−rtE
(
−
∫ ·
0
µ˜(Yu)
σ˜(Yu)
dWu
)
t
e
−p˜imax
(
1− w′(log(u/l))
(1−w(log(u/l)))w(log(u/l))
)
Ut ,
with the local time process U from (5.8). Then M˜ is a discount factor:
E[X˜ψT M˜T ] ≤ X˜ψ0 .
Proof. First, notice that µ˜, σ˜ and w are functions of Y , but the argument is omitted throughout to
ease notation. Inserting the dynamics of S˜ yields
X˜ψT = X˜
ψ
0 E
(∫ ·
0
(
r + p˜iψt µ˜
)
dt+
∫ ·
0
p˜iψt σ˜dWt
)
T
e
∫ T
0 p˜i
ψ
t
(
1− w′
(1−w)w
)
dUt ,
where p˜iψ denotes the risky weight in terms of S˜. In view of Remark 5.5, we have p˜iψ ≤ p˜imax.
Furthermore, the identity (5.5) implies (1 − w′(1−w)w ) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0, if pimax > 1) on the set
{y = log(u/l)} where U increases (resp. decreases, if pimax > 1). Hence,
E[X˜ψT M˜T ] =E
[
X˜ψ0 E
(∫ ·
0
(r + p˜iψt µ˜)dt+
∫ ·
0
p˜iψt σ˜dWt
)
T
× E
(∫ ·
0
−rdt−
∫ ·
0
µ˜
σ˜
dWt
)
T
e
∫ T
0 (p˜i
ψ
t −p˜imax)(1− w
′
(1−w)w )dUt
]
≤E
[
X˜ψ0 E
(∫ ·
0
(
p˜iψσ˜ − µ˜
σ˜
)
dWt
)
T
]
≤ X˜ψ0 ,
where we have used for the last inequality that the positive local martingale E(∫ ·0(p˜iψσ˜− µ˜σ˜ )dWt) is
a supermartingale.
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If the candidate process S˜ from Lemma 5.6 is indeed a shadow price, then the optimal numbers
of safe and risky assets should be the same as in the original market with transaction costs. By
definition of S˜, the candidate optimal strategy derived heuristically in Section 4 therefore leads to
the following candidate for the long-run optimal risky weight in the shadow market:
p˜i(Yt) =
ϕtS˜t
ϕ0tS
0
t + ϕtS˜t
=
ϕtSt
w(Yt)
leYt (1−w(Yt))
ϕ0tS
0
t + ϕtSt
w(Yt)
leYt (1−w(Yt))
=
w(Yt)
1−w(Yt)
1 + w(Yt)1−w(Yt)
= w(Yt).
To show that this risky weight is indeed long-run optimal for S˜, we first establish the following
finite-horizon bounds in analogy to the frictionless case [11]:
Lemma 5.8. For a fixed time horizon T > 0, let β = µ
2
2γσ2
(1− (1−κ(1−λ))2) and let the function
w be defined as in Lemma 5.1. Then, for the the shadow payoff X˜T corresponding to the policy
p˜i(Y ) = w(Y ) and the shadow discount factor M˜T introduced in Lemma 5.7, the following bounds
hold true:
E[X˜1−γT ] = X˜
1−γ
0 e
(1−γ)(r+β)T Eˆ[e(1−γ)(q˜(YT )−q˜(Y0))], (5.11)
E[M˜
1− 1
γ
T ]
γ = e(1−γ)(r+β)T Eˆ[e(
1
γ
−1)(q˜(YT )−q˜(Y0))]γ , (5.12)
where q˜(y) :=
∫ y
0 (
w′(z)
1−w(z) − w(z))dz and Eˆ [·] denotes the expectation with respect to the myopic
probability Pˆ, defined by
dPˆ
dP
= exp
(∫ T
0
(
− µ˜(Yt)
σ˜(Yt)
+ σ˜(Yt)p˜i(Yt)
)
dWt − 1
2
∫ T
0
(
− µ˜(Yt)
σ˜(Yt)
+ σ˜(Yt)p˜i(Yt)
)2
dt
)
.
Proof. To ease the notation, we again omit the argument Y of the functions µ˜, σ˜, p˜i and w. To
obtain (5.11), notice that
X˜1−γT = X˜
1−γ
0 e
(1−γ) ∫ T0 (r+µ˜w− σ˜22 w2)dt+(1−γ) ∫ T0 σ˜wdWt+∫ T0 (1−γ)(w− w′1−w )Ut .
Hence,
X˜1−γT =X˜
1−γ
0
dPˆ
dP
e
∫ T
0
[
(1−γ)(r+µ˜w− σ˜2
2
w2)+ 1
2
(− µ˜
σ˜
+σ˜w)2
]
dt
× e
∫ T
0
[
(1−γ)σ˜w−(− µ˜
σ˜
+σ˜w)
]
dWt+
∫ T
0 (1−γ)(w− w
′
1−w )dUt .
Inserting the definitions of µ˜ and σ˜, the second integrand simplifies to (1−γ)σ( w′1−w −w). Similarly,
the first integrand reduces to (1−γ)(r+ σ22 ( w
′
1−w )
2− (1−γ)σ2w( w′1−w ) + (1−γ)σ
2
2 w
2). In summary:
X˜1−γT = X˜
1−γ
0
dPˆ
dP
e
(1−γ) ∫ T0 (r+σ22 ( w′1−w)2−(1−γ)σ2w( w′1−w)+(1−γ)σ22 w2)dt
×e(1−γ)
[∫ T
0
(
w′
1−w−w
)
σdWt−
∫ T
0
(
w′
1−w−w
)
dUt
]
. (5.13)
Itoˆ’s formula and the boundary conditions for w imply that
q˜(YT )− q˜(Y0) =
∫ T
0
(
w′
1− w − w
)
σdWt −
∫ T
0
(
w′
1− w − w
)
dUt
+
∫ T
0
(
µ− σ
2
2
)(
w′
1− w − w
)
+
σ2
2
(
w′′(1− w) + w′2
(1− w)2 − w
′
)
dt. (5.14)
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Substituting the second derivative w′′ according to the equation (5.10) and using this identity to
replace the stochastic integral in (5.13) yields
X˜1−γT = X˜
1−γ
0
dPˆ
dP
e
(1−γ) ∫ T0 (r+σ22 w′+(1−γ)σ22 w2+(µ−σ22 )w)dte(1−γ)(q˜(YT )−q˜(Y0)).
Thus, the first bound results from taking expectations on both sides and using the ODE for w (cf.
Lemma 5.1).
Similarly, plugging in the definitions of µ˜ and σ˜, the (shadow) discount factor M˜T and the
myopic probability measure Pˆ satisfy
M˜
1− 1
γ
T = e
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
µ˜
σ˜
dWt+
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
r+ µ˜
2
2σ˜2
)
dt+ 1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
w− w′
1−w
)
dUt
=
dPˆ
dP
e
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
µ˜
σ˜
− γ
1−γ (− µ˜σ˜+σ˜w)
)
dWt+
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
w− w′
1−w
)
dUt
×e
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
r+ µ˜
2
2σ˜2
+ γ
2(1−γ)(− µ˜σ˜+σ˜w)
2
)
dt
=
dPˆ
dP
e
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
w′
1−w−w
)
σdWt− 1−γγ
∫ T
0
(
w′
1−w−w
)
dUt
×e
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
r+σ
2
2
(
w′
1−w
)2−(1−γ)σ2w( w′
1−w
)
+(1−γ)σ2
2
w2
)
dt
.
Substituting again the stochastic integral with equation (5.14) and (5.10) we obtain
M˜
1− 1
γ
T =
dPˆ
dP
e
1−γ
γ
∫ T
0
(
r+σ
2
2
w′+(1−γ)σ2
2
w2+
(
µ−σ2
2
)
w
)
dt
e
1−γ
γ
(q˜(YT )−q˜(Y0)).
Finally, the second bound results from taking the expectations on both sides, raising it to the power
of γ, and using the ODE for w from Lemma 5.1.
With the finite-horizon bounds at hand, it is now straightforward to establish the long-run
optimality of the policy p˜i(Y ) = w(Y ) in the shadow market. Note that this strategy does not
take advantage of the available arbitrage opportunities: It already attains the portfolio constraint
whenever the singular component of S˜ acts, hence the constraints prevent it from further increasing
its risky position to profit from this.13
Lemma 5.9. Let 0 < pimax 6= 1 and let w be defined as in Lemma 5.1. Then, the policy p˜i(Y ) =
w(Y ) is long-run optimal in the shadow market (S0, S˜) with equivalent safe rate r + β, where β is
specified in Lemma 5.8. For t ≥ 0, the corresponding wealth process and the numbers of safe and
risky assets are given by
X˜t = (ξ
0S00 + ξS˜0)E
(∫ ·
0
(r + w(Ys)µ˜(Ys))ds+
∫ ·
0
w (Ys) σ˜ (Ys) dWs +
∫ ·
0
(
w (Ys)− w
′(Ys)
1−(w(Ys))
)
dUs
)
t
,
ϕ0− = ξ, ϕt = w (Yt) X˜t/S˜t, ϕ
0
0− = ξ
0, ϕ0t = (1− w (Yt)) X˜t/S0t .
Proof. The formulas for the wealth process and the number of safe and risky units follow directly
from the respective definitions. By definition of S˜ and the formulas for ϕ0, ϕ the corresponding
risky weight in terms of the ask price is given by pit =
leYt
1+leYt
. Since Y is reflected to remain between
13A similar example of a market with arbitrage opportunities for which the optimal policy does not exploit these
can be found in [9, Example 5.1]. Whereas the latter is somewhat pathological, this situation arises naturally in the
present context when looking for an equivalent frictionless shadow market.
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0 and log(u/l), it takes values between l1+l = (1−λ)pimax and u1+u = pimax, such that the constraint
(2.2) is satisfied.
To verify the optimality of this policy, we use the standard duality bound for power utility (cf.
[11, Lemma 5], which is applicable by Lemma 5.7), valid for the shadow payoff X˜ψT of any admissible
strategy (ψ0, ψ) in the shadow market:
E[(X˜ψT )
1−γ ]
1
1−γ ≤ E[(M˜T )
γ−1
γ ]
γ
1−γ .
This inequality and the second bound (5.12) in Lemma 5.8 yield an upper bound for the equivalent
safe rate:
lim inf
T→∞
1
(1− γ)T logE[(X˜
ψ
T )
1−γ ] ≤ lim inf
T→∞
γ
(1− γ)T logE[(M˜
γ−1
γ
T )] = r + β.
Here, we used in the last step that q˜ is bounded on the compact support of its argument Y .
Similarly, the first bound (5.11) in Lemma 5.8 implies that the upper bound r + β is attained by
the policy p˜i, which corresponds to the strategy (ϕ0, ϕ).
To conclude that S˜ is indeed a shadow price, it remains to check that the optimal strategy
(ϕ0, ϕ) only acts on the sets {Yt = 0} and {Yt = log (u/l)}.
Lemma 5.10. Let 0 < pimax 6= 1. Then, the number of shares ϕ = w(Y )X˜/S˜ for the optimal policy
from Lemma 5.9 has the dynamics
dϕt
ϕt
= (1− pimax(1− λ))dLt − 1− pimax
1− pimax + pimax(1− )dUt.
Thus, ϕt increases only when {Yt = 0}, that is, when S˜t equals the ask price, and decreases only
when {Yt = log (u/l)}, that is, when S˜t equals the bid price. In particular, it is of finite variation.
Proof. Itoˆ’s formula, the boundary conditions for w, and Equation (5.10) imply
dw(Yt) = −(1− γ)σ2w′(Yt)w(Yt)dt+ σw′(Yt)dWt + w′(Yt)(dLt − dUt).
Integrating ϕ = w(Y )X˜/S˜ by parts twice, using the dynamics of w(Y ), X˜ and S˜, and simplifying
yields
dϕt/ϕt = w
′(Yt)/w(Yt)dLt − (1− w(Yt))dUt.
Since Lt and Ut only increase (resp. decrease, if pimax > 1) on {Yt = 0} and {Yt = log (u/l)},
respectively, the assertion then follows from the boundary conditions for w and identity (5.4).
Since the shadow price takes values in the bid-ask spread, it allows the investor to trade at
more favorable prices than in the original market with transaction costs. As the optimal strategy
(ϕ0, ϕ) only entails buying (resp. selling) the risky asset when S˜ coincides with the ask (resp. bid)
price, it is also feasible with transaction costs, and therefore optimal with the same growth rate.
Lemma 5.11. For sufficiently small , the policy (ϕ0, ϕ) from Lemma 5.9 is also long-run optimal
in the original market with transaction costs, with the same equivalent safe rate r + β.
Proof. This follows along the lines of [8, Proposition C.5].
Let us summarize our results so far.
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Theorem 5.12. For a small spread  > 0, and a binding portfolio constraint 0 < pimax 6= 1, the
process S˜ in Lemma 5.6 is a shadow price in the sense of Definition 5.4. A long-run optimal
policy with equivalent safe rate r + β, both for the shadow market and for the original market with
transaction costs, is to keep the risky weight pi (in terms of the ask price S) within the no-trade
region
[pi−, pi+] = [(1− λ)pimax, pimax].
5.3 Trading Volume
The formulas for share and wealth turnover follow from [8, Lemma D.2] along the lines of [8,
Corollary D.3]. Plugging the asymptotics for the gap λ into these explicit formulas yields the
corresponding expansions for share and wealth turnover.
5.4 Approximate Optimality for Finite Horizons
Finally we show that, like in the absence of constraints, the stationary long-run optimal policy is
also approximately optimal for any finite horizon T > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. For a fixed time horizon T let (ψ0, ψ) be any admissible strategy. The
liquidation value ΞψT of this strategy is smaller than the corresponding shadow payoff X˜
ψ
T , i.e.,
ΞψT ≤ X˜ψT = ψ00 + ψ0S˜0 +
∫ T
0 ψsdS˜s. Thus, the standard duality bound for power utility as in [11,
Lemma 5] and the second bound (5.12) in Lemma 5.8 imply that
1
(1− γ)T logE[(Ξ
ψ
T )
1−γ ] ≤ r+β+ 1
T
log (ψ00− + ψ0−S0)+
γ
(1− γ)T log Eˆ[e
( 1
γ
−1)(q˜(YT )−q˜(Y0))]. (5.15)
For the long-run optimal strategy (ϕ0, ϕ) we have ΞϕT ≥ (1 − pimax/(1 − ))X˜T . Hence, the first
bound (5.11) in Lemma 5.8 yields
1
(1− γ)T logE[(Ξ
ϕ
T )
1−γ ] ≥ r + β + 1
T
log (ϕ00− + ϕ0−S˜0) (5.16)
+
1
(1− γ)T log Eˆ[e
(1−γ)(q˜(YT )−q˜(Y0))] +
1
T
log
(
1− 
1− pimax
)
.
For  ↓ 0, we have log (1− pimax/(1− )) = O() and log (ϕ00− + ϕ0−S˜0) ≥ log (ϕ00− + ϕ0−S0)+O()
because S˜ ∈ [(1 − )S, S]. Moreover, since λ = O(1/2) and log (u/l) = O(1/2), the identities
(5.4), (5.10) and Taylor expansion yield
w′(z)
1− w(z) − w(z) =
κ2µ2
γσ2
(
1− 1
κ
)
1/2 +O () .
Therefore, q˜(y) =
∫ y
0 (
w′(z)
1−w(z) − w(z))dz is also of order O () for y ≤ | log(u/l)|, which completes
the proof.
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